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Public Policy and the Life Not Worth Living: 
The Case Against Euthanasia 
Richard Sherlock 
The author is assistant professor of human values and ethics at the 
University of Tennessee Center for the Health Sciences and assistant 
professor of philosophy at the University of Tennessee. 
In several recent articles in Linacre Quarterly, Lisa Cahill has 
offered an interesting defense of euthanasia from what she conceives 
of as a "natural law" point of view. 1 In her discussion she presents a 
novel interpretation of St. Thomas which leads to a revised under-
standing of the principle of totality and a consequent justification for 
sacrificing a temporal, bodily good on behalf of a trans-temporal end, 
the well-being of the " whole person" especially as this "person" is 
religiously conceived of as a soul. 
The argument presented for this viewpoint is quite simple and Ms. 
Cahill is hardly the only one using it. Unfortunately, it is deeply 
flawed in two fundamental ways.2 It begins with a serious misinterpre-
tation of St. Thomas.3 As a result of this error the argument ignores 
the connection between private and public virtue and the consequent 
powerful argument against euthanasia as a publicly allowable act or 
policy. Each of these two points will receive comment below, but first 
we must briefly review the argument at stake. 
One version of the general argument is made in the following form: 
1. The "whole person" is more important than the body. 
2. The welfare of the "whole person" therefore transcends the wel-
fare of the body. 
3. In some cases the welfare of the person is harmed by continual 
life in the body. 
4. Therefore, in some cases euthanasia is morally permissible. 
Essentially, this argument asks us to take seriously the transcend-
ental end of the human person and to judge human activity in general 
and individual acts in particular in light of this end. "Totality" is thus 
enlarged from its narrow meaning in the manualists to include a 
"wholistic view of the person that is much more plausible and more 
theologically sound than that found in the older manualist tradition 
with its heavy reliance on physiological categories. 4 . 
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As applied to euthanasia issues, however, the above argument is 
quite defective. First, on the question of the interpretation of Thomas 
we must note several things. 
1. Thomas would never hold proposition 2 in a blanket form. He 
says quite clearly that suicide is never permissible . Using the termin-
ology of "intrinsically" evil (which is basically manualist, anyway) just 
obfuscates the issue. What we want to know is whether and under 
what conditions the act in question is morally permissible, and on the 
question of suicide Thomas is unmistakably clear. 5 
2. The key weakness in the argument is the move from 3 to 4. This 
is a move that Thomas would never make, at least not as it is stated 
above. He would need to know all of the moral categories that should 
be applied to an act and he would need to be convinced that none of 
these categories, when applied to the act in question, led to its being 
morally impermissible. It will do us well to briefly try this ourselves. 
In a Thomistic context euthanasia would most directly fall under 
the category of justice. To be sure, the other "self regarding" virtues 
are relevant, but since euthanasia is principally an act involving a 
patient and his physician it properly falls under the province of justice 
as the one virtue that regulates interactions between persons. 6 For 
Thomas, however, justice has two different forms or aspects, a fact 
that many of these modern interpreters have overlooked. 
The first form is the more common jus involved in the interaction 
between two specific persons. If a patient contracts with his or her 
physician to pay him for certain services (say, removal of a breast 
lump) then a certain jus exists between them, and justice demands 
that the physician perform the services he has agreed to perform and 
that the patient pay accordingly. 7 
The second form of justice is what Thomas calls "general" or 
"legal" justice. In this regard he explains its meaning in a key passage: 
Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in 
both these senses. Now it is evident that the individuals in a commu nity 
stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole while a part as such 
belongs to whole so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to 
the good of a whole. It is therefore that the good of any virtue whether such 
virtue direct man in relation to himself or in relation to certain other indi-
vidual persons is referable to the common good to which justice directs: So 
that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice insofar as it directs man to the 
common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a gene ral virtue. And in 
the sense that it belongs to the law to direct to the common good. . it 
follows that the justice which in this way is styled general is called legal 
justice .... 
Consequently there must be one supreme virtue , essentially distinct from 
every other virtue which directs all the virtues to the common good and this 
virtue is legal justice. 8 
What Thomas says here can hardly be missed by the perceptive 
reader. He maintains that human life and activity occur within a 
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specific political-social context: "Homo naturaliter est animal 
sociale. "9 Given this truism, Thomas then argues that one category 
under which all human activity must be judged is the impact of such 
activity on the common good of the political regime within which that 
activity takes place.1 0 An action that violates the common good of 
that society cannot be permitted morally no matter how well it might 
square with the other virtues; What must be stressed is that this is still 
a moral judgment. We are still in the context of justice as a specific 
virtue regulative of human acts. Quite simply, Thomas would never 
maintain that an act could be morally permitted yet remain legally 
proscribed on "public policy" grounds. If an act would be harmful or 
wrong as public policy then Thomas is quite clear: it is not a morally 
permissible act. 11 
The above is simply a theoretical restatement of Thomas' position. 
Essentially he asks us to reject the facile separation of public policy 
and private morality that is common in our own day. He asks us to 
consider the possibility that what we do in the concrete affects the 
whole within which we live as well as determining the kind of moral 
beings we will be in the future. If we are to be just as human beings 
then we must live in a just community - one that we maintain by our 
adherence to the principles of justice. 
Essential to Understand Framework 
It is essential to understand the above framework if we are to form 
any kind of reasonable approach to the question of euthanasia on 
Thomistic principles. If one overlooks the implications for the com-
mon good of euthanasia as a policy one is easily driven to reach 
conclusions that are dubious or simply incoherent when such consider-
ations are added. It seems to me that it is at this point that arguments 
similar to those presented by Ms. Cahill fall apart. 
As it is stated, the argument asks us to accept the proposition that 
there are some lives not worth living any more. It is obvious that this 
sort of judgment must be made in the context of decisions to with-
hold treatment or induce death, but the full implications of this most 
aweso me judgment are not obvious and are often ignored. Two impli-
cations of this judgment need to be amplified. 
First, the policy demands of us a public judgment that some 
ongoing human lives no longer merit the most minimal of civic rights 
normally enjoyed by all other citizens.12 Secondly, it demands of us 
that this judgment be one that can be fairly applied by anyone to 
determine whether or not another person has or lacks the " life worth 
living. " 13 We can best explicate the significance of both of these 
points by examining a series of cases as follows: 
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Case I. A patient asks his physician to withdraw life-saving therapy. 
Now the physician is hardly going to automatically accede to this 
request. He will recognize t hat any number of factors from momen-
tary anguish or financial worries to actual clinical depression may 
intervene as a contraindication . As a seriously concerned m oral agent, 
he will ask what he should do, not just what the patient wants. He will 
thus be concerned to decide for himself if this patient's request is at 
all reasonable, i. e ., would it be reasonable for a patient in this con-
dition to conclude that life is no longer worth living. 
Case II. The parents of a newborn with abnormalities which would 
lead to retardation and physical handicaps ask that the newborn not 
be t reated. Again, t he doctor will ask what he should do, not just what 
the parents want. Surely he will not accede to a request from a 
Jehovah's Witness to withdraw transfusion from a perfectly normal 
child . If he will not, t hen it is clear that he will need to decide in 
which cases he is going to honor the request of the parents and in 
which cases he is not. 
Physicians Must Make Judgment 
In both of these examples the physician is going to have to make an 
independent judgment that the life in question is one that is not worth 
living anymore. He will need to judge that in the instant case the right 
of the person to expect the physician to save his life, to not have his 
death engineered by others, is not to be respected. In other words, the 
most primeval of our civic rights - the right to have life protected 
from those intrusions of others t hat are designed to end it - is here to 
be set aside. Secondly, this judgment must be a public judgment which 
could be fairly applied to all other cases. What could be more unfair 
than to decide that you know what the grounds are for this most final 
judgment and then be unwilling to deny this great good to all others 
who "deserve" it. Consider two infants with the same abnormalities . It 
would be the worst injustice to decide that in the one case you will let 
an infant die on the basis of a parental request and yet in the other 
case "burden" the infant with continued life m erely because t he par-
ents want this.1 4 If t he physician, as an independent m oral agent, has 
decided that he has the wisdom to make such a judgment then he 
ought to have the courage to apply his judgment justly . 
What the physician is asked to do in the above cases is to violate a 
normal prohibition against bringing about the death of another per-
son, whether by actively inducing death or by withdrawing those 
things the person needs to sustain life. Any such policy recommenda-
tion requires the formulation of a set of publicly announced standards 
124 Linacre Quarterly 
or criteria by which we can know which lives are so worthless that 
they no longer merit the most minimal protections afforded to all 
other citizens. Failure to provide such a standard is an open door to 
the worst abuses of an arbitrary grant of this awesome discretionary 
power - the power to decide that one human being has a life so 
devoid of worth or quality that he no longer merits the protections we 
all take for granted. As Phillip Heyman and Sarah Holtz have recently 
written: 
It is not obvious there is one form of words or concepts available for 
defining who is to be a full member of a society that promises greater 
permanence in the face of changing political views and more consistent 
application by large numbers of individuals than another form of expres· 
sion. But if there is, surely there is an immense social advantage to adopting 
the more permanent, more readily applicable form. Clear , lasting lines have 
an immense social advantage in defining those who are to be considered 
fully human and protected members of our society and excluding those who 
are not. A sense of security and acceptance which underlies the very con· 
cepts of rights and self respect and which is a precondition of human happi-
ness, depends upon knowing when one or a member of one's family is a 
fully protected member of the community. Society should be and is pre-
pared to pay a great pri~e to define person· hood with considerable clarity. 
Neither doctor, nor parents nor courts nor even legislatures should be 
entrusted with discretionary decisions as to whose life can be taken with 
impunity. Recent history is too full of examples of abuse of that dis· 
cretion. 15 
Furthermore, failure to provide such a standard, or providing only a 
vague and open-ended one violates some of the most primitive norms 
of moral discourse: 1) that a normative recommendation ought, when 
generalized to all relevantly similar cases, lead to acceptable conclu-
sions and 2) exceptions to a normative principle or rule ought to be 
framed in such a way that the exceptions do not destroy the force of 
the rule. 16 
The immense difficulties of formulating a set of criteria that will 
avoid these problems has never been squarely faced by the partisans of 
euthanasia policies. Time and time again we are confronted with vague 
claims about "death with dignity' or even more arbitrary and ill-con-
ceived standards that can hardly be generalized, even in a modest 
way. 17 As one example of these deficiencies, consider the current dis-
cussions of involuntary euthanasia of "defective newborns." 
Since so much effort has gone into the discussion of the treatment 
for severely defective newborns, one might suspect that clear, reason-
able guidelines might have been developed that avoid the problems to 
which I am pointing. Unfortunately, this seems to be a vain hope. 
When we turn to this literature, we find a plethora of hopelessly vague 
claims and an assortment of actual policy proposals as incoherent and 
inapplicable as would be a proposal to reintroduce slavery. Examples 
are numerous. Some writers have claimed that infants lacking any 
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ability or potential to " relate to others" ought to be candidates for 
death.1 8 Of course they never tell us how much or how little of this 
ability is required since, if the level is set even modestly high, we wind 
up with frightening advice about what to do with illness in thousands 
of severely retarded persons and if even the smallest amount of the 
potential qualifies , then the policy is self-defeating since almost any 
infant would qualify.19 Others have focused on the presence of severe 
retardation alone, again with no attention to what this means if fairly 
applied to all other retarded persons , nor with any rationale beyond 
circular claims about " burdensomeness" for why we should consider 
retardation so important. 20 Still others have focused on the presence 
of multiple handicaps such as non-ambulation, bowel incontinence, 
blindness and/or retardation, without of course telling us what rela-
tion any of these handicaps has with a life not worth living nor con-
fronting what such a policy would mean for all other persons similarly 
situated. 21 Finally, one writer seems content with telling us that some 
defective infants will be great burdens on their families. 22 
It seems obvious that until we are given reasonably precise , coher-
ent and generalizable criteria for deciding that one human life is no 
longer worth living, the policies under review in cases 1 and 2 will fail 
even the most minimal test of rationality and fairness. This criticism 
ought to be sufficient to put to rest the argument so far presented on 
behalf of such views. In the last section of this essay, however, I would 
like to suggest an even more far-reaching point: that the search for 
such criteria represents an ultimate perversion of the liberal principles 
on which our regime was founded and that until we contemplate 
endorsing a fundamentally, different sort of polity the idea of " life not 
worth living" ought to be as much of a "closed question " insofar as 
public policy is concerned, as slavery has become. 23 
Pretense or Arbitrariness 
The proposition that there is such a thing as a life not worth living 
amounts to the claim that some human lives are not to be protected 
by the normal constraints which protect the rest of us in our everyday 
lives. More specifically, this, is either a pretension to have a type of 
knowledge that our society always has denied it possessed or else it is 
merely an example of the worst and most nihilistic arbitrariness. To 
state the second alternative is to refute it, so we will consider the first 
briefly. 
The claim to this sort of knowledge represents a systematic rejec-
tion of the compromise found at the heart of liberal political philos-
ophy and embodied in the founding documents of the American 
re gi me (The Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
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tion).24 Philosophically speaking, this compromise was constituted by 
a turning away from the ancient concern for virtue as the end of 
political life. As philosphers, the founders of liberalism were skeptical 
of any such claims to know the ultimately good and worthwhile life in 
a definitive and politically applicable manner. As students of history 
and political affairs they knew even better how often such pretensions 
can be abused. They had too many memories of the Star Chamber, the 
Inquisition, or bills of attainder. As students of biblical and ancient 
history they knew what happened to the wise Solomon and the fate of 
Rome after the genius of Augustus. 
Founders of Liberalism Sought New Regime 
The founders of liberalism thus sought to construct a regime which 
would close off the possibility of a philosopher-king as the price for 
avoiding the unrestrained rule of a Nero or a Claudius.25 They sought 
a regime which abstracted from any attempt to set forth the knowl-
edge of the Ultimately worthwhile or worthless life. Such knowledge 
was not within human purview and to pretend that it was only led to 
the worst results both for individuals and for the political commun-
ities in which they lived. 
Since such knowledge was not politically available, liberal regimes 
have historically asserted that every life was of equal political worth, 
especially with respect to the most minimal of civic rights. All men 
were endowed with the minimal rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit 
I ) of happiness," and the role of politics was reduced to preserving per-
sons in the exercise of these minimal rights, nothing more.26 In this 
sense we might generally say that the belief in human equality vis-a-vis 
the ends of politics is the sine qua non of liberal regimes. However, the 
two constitutive features of our regime, liberty and equality, cannot 
be separated. The liberal commitment to human freedom renders nec-
essary the protection of the equal minimal rights of every person. The 
reverse is just as true. Only a commitment to the equal basic worth of 
every person renders coherent the commitment to liberty. If it is 
really believed that someone has a life not worth living, then those 
who supposedly "know" this know something about what makes life 
ultimately worthwhile, which should be given appropriate shape in 
public policies restricting freedom and preventing the burdening of 
some beings with continued life. Surely if we really are convinced of 
our knowledge in this matter, then the most inconsistent and unjust 
thing to do would be to deprive the rest of us the benefits of laws 
based on this knowledge -laws that will restrict our freedom to 
define the worthwhile life for ourselves. 
Liberal regimes are thus committed to the principles of liberty and 
equality as constitutive of their very essence. Though they do seek to 
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foster the widest possible scope for individual liberty to pursue idio-
syncratic ends and private pleasures, they also deliberately close off 
those policy alternatives that conflict so deeply with their very essence 
that to permit them is to pervert the very meaning of liberalism 
beyond any conceivable degree of mere accommodation to historical 
circumstance. It is these constitutive principles of liberal regimes, 
embodying their specific genius, that transcend the matrix of private 
passion and political discussion they foster and protect. Insofar as 
these principles are concerned, the liberal citizen is not free to act in 
ways destructive of the very essence of the polity; he is not free to 
enslave another or sell himself into slavery nor is he free to treat 
another as if he were an animal, conducting risky or lethal experi-
ments on those he considers to be worthless or bestial. Even the great 
liberal, Mill, recognized that one ought not to be free to sell oneself 
into slavery, no matter how happy one might be enslaved. 27 
This dialectical truth at the heart of liberalism that Mill seems to 
have obliquely realized - that some policy questions must remain 
"closed" even in a liberal regime - was given a most profound artic-
ulation in America by Abraham Lincoln. In the turbulent decade 
before the Civil War, Lincoln engaged in a remarkable series of public 
debates and speeches as penetrating in their content as any public 
messages in our political experience. The deepest meaning of his mes-
sage bears remembering here. 28 
Very briefly, Lincoln argued that the real evil in slavery was not its 
denial of liberty, as egregious as that might be. The real issue was that 
a policy of slavery ended up treating one ostensible human being as if 
he were not a human being at all. Slavery did not just deny to one 
person the rights and privileges enjoyed by another. It ended up assert-
ing that the enslaved had no political rights at all. In political terms 
the enslaved had been reduced to an animalistic existence, deprived of 
even the most primitive and inalienable rights with which other men 
are supposedly endowed. This was the worst evil of slavery. It denied 
the status of the slave as one whose freedom and civil equality were to 
be protected. The slave was no longer human; he was now a "brute" in 
Lincoln's words. Not being human, he had no liberty and no civil 
status from which to claim his equality and liberty and to challenge 
those who denied either one. In one of his key addresses he put the 
point succinctly: 
I ask attention to the fact that in a prominent degree these popular sover-
eigns are at this work: blowing out the moral lights around us, teaching that 
the Negro is no longer a man but a brute, that the Declaration has nothing 
to do with him, that he ranks with the crocodile and the reptile , that man 
with body and soul is a matter of dollars and cents. I suggest to this portion 
of Ohio Republicans, or Democrats if there be any present, the serious 
consideration of this fact that there is now going on among you a steady 
process of debauching public opinion on this subject. 29 
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Lincoln knew the dialectical truth of liberalism that we have forgot-
ten. Amid the pressures to amend our social rules and create different 
forms of social organization, the principles embodied in constitutions 
and charters of government must transcend the political matrix of free 
action that these very principles protect. These principles define the 
very essence of our life together as a people. They seek to give us a 
vision of our ultimate commitments as a society and define for us who 
counts as a member of this society. To ignore these principles is not 
only to ask that they be changed in their particulars, but also to ask 
for a fundamentally different sort of regime, a question few of us are 
really prepared to ask. 
Specific Questions of Euthanasia Debate 
This is the only appropriate place to begin to consider the specific 
questions of the euthanasia debate- to recognize that once we decide 
that one ongoing human life is not worth living, we have taken a mo-
mentous step. We have declared our independence from our past, as it 
were, and decided that for this one life, Lincoln's proposition that the 
American regime was "dedicated to the proposition that all men are 
created equal" is not true. Furthermore, we have decided that we, the 
"normal," the "healthy," know how to tell when the life of another 
moves over that line which marks the existence of the rest of us as 
beings worthy of protection from the machinations of others. 
To say, as Ms. Cahill and others do, that their recommendations are 
made "in accord with the full human dignity and value of the dying 
individual" is simply incoherent. 30 In political terms, the dignity of 
the individual is usually expressed in prohibitions against activities of 
the sort these writers now wish to sanction. Prima facie, these same 
prohibitions ought to apply as measures of our commitment to the 
worth of these individuals. Why don't they? Because these individuals 
supposedly lack the worth that all the rest of us have, the worth that 
makes our polity value and protect us. In political terms, no better 
definition could be had of trying to read someone out of the human 
family. Such is the logical outcome of these arguments. 
It will perhaps be said that the above argument is defective because 
it relies on a "wedge" claim that predicts social disaster if a first 
euthanasia step is taken. Since we have no reason to suppose that all 
physicians are as depraved as the Nazis, my argument will not work. 
This is a gross misunderstanding of my point. I have no such pre-
science as this and I am not claiming to predict the future. What I am 
claiming is that all policies for engineering the death of some ongoing, 
savable human lives logically involve one fundamental judgment that 
represents a radical departure from our most cherished principles. 
Secondly, I am claiming that the most primitive requirements of moral 
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discourse lead us to conclude that the policies we have so far seen 
developed in the literature would logically apply to thousands of per-
sons who are also debilitated, retarded, handicapped, etc. 31 
The argument I am making does not predict the future. It asks what 
is the logical outcome of the proposed policies. It assumes that the 
proponents of these policies wish them to be applied fairly and asks 
what this would mean for thousands of other persons similarly sit-
uated. If the proponents wish to give up the requirement of fair appli-
cation then they must come forward with a compelling case for doing 
so. Until then, the logic of their arguments leads them in ways in 
which I seriously doubt any of them are prepared to go. 
In the last decade the problems of "euthanasia," of "death with 
dignity," and of withdrawing care from the defective and the debil-
itated have become a focus of national debate. Yet when all the 
clamor has stopped, the intractable problems for the devotees of these 
views remain. We are still in need of clear, coherent and applicable 
criteria for deciding just when a person is a candidate for death. We 
are still in need of criteria that will not logically lead to frightening 
results if applied fairly to all those similarly situated. Finally, the 
search for such standards still involves us in that historic break from 
the liberal tradition of respecting the 9inimal rights of every person 
equally. 
In his finest piece of political rhetoric, Lincoln reminded us that 
our regime was "dedicated to the proposition that all men are created 
equal." As he well knew, the ultimate perversion of that belief was the 
assertion that some men were so superior they could decide to treat 
others as if they were not equal even in the most minimal of political 
senses. Might we not see another example of this pretension among 
those who now wish to endorse as a final solution to the problems of 
the helpless and the debilitated a policy which ends in claiming that 
some human lives are not worth protecting and sustaining anymore? 32 
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